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Abstract 
A trade policy that is global in perspective and the lowering of trade costs are critical for Ukraine. 
Two regional trade agreements are at the center of attention in Ukraine. One is the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU that Ukraine has, at least temporarily, 
recently rejected; the other is an invitation to join the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) with Russia. We 
argue that Ukraine should focus on addressing specific policy areas that negatively affect trade with 
both of its neighboring customs unions. In addition to intergovernmental trade agreements that center 
on deeper integration with both blocs, we suggest Ukraine put in place a number of “supply chain 
councils” (public-private partnerships that focus on the main sources of supply chain trade frictions) 
organized around the major export sectors for Ukraine, the ECU countries as well as the EU. The 
councils would have a mandate to identify the most important sources of supply chain inefficiencies as 
well as actions to resolve them. The recent proposal by Ukraine to establish a joint commission among 
Ukraine, Russia and the EU to promote trade could be used as a step in this direction. 
Keywords 
Ukraine, trade policy, Eurasian Customs Union, regional integration 
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A Vision for Ukraine in the World Economy* 
Defining a Trade Policy Strategy that Leverages Global Opportunities 
In 1991, Ukraine gained its independence from the former Soviet Union and began formulating a 
national trade policy. Ukraine achieved an important milestone in integrating with the international 
trading community on May 16, 2008, when it formally acceded to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Following its WTO accession, Ukraine negotiated a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) with the European Union (EU). On November 21, 2013, however, Ukraine 
suspended preparations for signing the DCFTA at the Third EU-Eastern Partnership Summit in 
Vilnius on November 28-29, 2013. High level EU officials held open the possibility of concluding the 
agreement with Ukraine in the future, and of closer cooperation in the interim.
1
 In 2010, the Russian 
Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan formed the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) and have invited 
Ukraine to become a member. Some senior EU officials maintained that the Ukrainian decision not to 
sign the DCFTA was due to extreme pressure from Russia.
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The DCFTA and possible membership in the ECU have generated much attention in Ukraine—in 
the press, among policymakers and the business community. Both the EU and the ECU markets are 
very important to Ukraine. These trade agreements are worthy of extensive discussion and debate. In 
what follows we suggest that it would be best to do so in light of an overarching vision of how 
Ukraine can use integration into the global economy to achieve its national development and growth 
objectives. We propose new institutional mechanisms to identify concrete policy initiatives that will 
help realize this vision while also benefitting trade partners. While apparently rejecting the DCFTA 
with the EU, Ukraine appears to be suggesting new mechanisms that are compatible with our 
recommendation. Ukraine has proposed a joint commission to promote trade between Ukraine, Russia 
and the EU, and Russia’s initial reaction was positive.3  
I. Defining a Vision 
Any vision for trade policy should consider how integration of Ukraine into international markets can 
help achieve greater prosperity: new jobs and investments with advanced technologies; a good choice 
of products and services at reasonable prices, widely available to both companies and citizens. This 
will need to cover a broad set of policies, not just measures that apply at Ukraine’s borders that 
increase the cost for Ukrainian companies of competing in internationally. Businesses often face 
multiple types of regulations, regulators, and regulatory institutions that impose standards for both 
goods and services. Many of these policies operate “behind the border.” They are often justified on the 
basis of health, safety, security, quality, etc., but they can have a large impact on the costs of trade and 
trade opportunities. 
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A growing number of countries have shown that a strategy centered on deep integration into 
international markets can be a powerful mechanism to sustain high growth rates over several decades. 
Examples are found in Asia, Europe and Latin America. The successful countries differ widely in 
terms of size, availability of natural resources and economic structure. But they have one thing in 
common: a clearly articulated and consistently implemented global trade strategy aimed at leveraging 
the opportunities offered by the world market to create high productivity industries as well as a wide 
variety of services. Given the importance of Ukraine’s immediate neighbors for its exports—the EU 
and Russia—a key determinant of the extent to which Ukraine will be able to leverage its location and 
comparative advantages to the fullest will be its ability to trade effectively with both of these 
important neighbors. 
Chile is a useful model for Ukraine to consider. It has been one of the world’s faster growing 
economies in the past 30 years, and 20 years ago faced trade policy choices similar to what Ukraine 
faces today. In the early 1990s, its large neighbor Brazil led the formation of the MERCOSUR 
Customs Union among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Analogous to the ECU’s invitation 
to Ukraine, Chile was invited to join MERCOSUR. Chile’s core trade strategy at the time (as it 
continues to be) was to pursue a global trade strategy involving a mix of free trade agreements with 
any country that was willing to do so, especially with the US and the EU, and also to lower its external 
tariff on a most favored nation basis. Since the common external trade policy of the MERCOSUR 
customs union would prevent Chile from pursuing this strategy, it declined to join the Customs Union. 
Crucially, its large neighbor Brazil and the other MERCOSUR members accommodated Chile’s 
sovereign policy decision, and Chile negotiated a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR that forged 
closer relations. Chile subsequently negotiated a broad set of free trade agreements, including deep 
free trade agreements with the US and then the EU, while lowering its import tariffs to a uniform six 
percent. Research has found that Chile gained very significantly from implementing its core trade 
policy strategy of lowering its uniform tariff multilaterally and negotiating a large network of free 
trade agreements (Harrison et al. 2002). Building on the Observer status of Ukraine in the ECU, we 
discuss below some concrete proposals for deeper cooperation between Ukraine and the ECU, while 
preserving the global focus of our suggested trade strategy for Ukraine that is similar to that of Chile.  
II. Strategies for Success from the Rapid Growth Countries 
In considering how trade policy can be designed to help achieve rapid growth of incomes, it is useful 
to consider concrete experiences. Annex table 1 provides per capita income data in purchasing power 
parity terms over time for six countries that have grown very rapidly over time: four so-called East 
Asian tigers (often described as “development miracle” countries)—Singapore, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, China—which have all grown rapidly since the 1960s; and Chile and Mauritius, 
which have grown rapidly during the past 30 years. In the case of Singapore and Hong Kong, growth 
rates were such that by 2012 per capita incomes exceeded that of the United States. In the early 1960s 
South Korea’s per capita income was less than $200, among the poorest the world—comparable to the 
poorer sub-Saharan countries. By 2012, their per capita income had increased to more than $32,000. 
Taiwan’s real per capita income increased almost nine times in the past 30 years to almost $39,000. In 
2012, Chile’s per capita income of $18,400 was 6 times higher than its level of three decades earlier. 
Over the same 30 year time period (1982-2012), the per capita income of Mauritius grew more than 
seven-fold to $15,600. Despite considerable diversity in policies and institutions among these 
countries, there are some important common features that spurred their development. 
1. Policy for Export Led Growth: Avoiding the Anti-Export Bias of High Tariffs  
All six rapid growth countries pursued a global trade strategy where their growth was fueled by 
exports. That is, they are examples of what is called “export led” growth. They achieved the large 
expansion of exports through both policies and institutions. Regarding policies, all these countries had 
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trade and regulatory regimes that provided exporters with incentives that were no worse than for sales 
on the domestic market. Tariff protection introduces an anti-export bias. The now rich countries of 
Singapore and Hong Kong, used free trade, i.e., zero tariffs, to avoid the anti-export bias. Chile used 
low uniform tariffs that declined over time combined with a large network of free trade agreements. 
Mauritius successfully used export processing zones. South Korea and Taiwan had declining tariffs 
over time and had efficient bureaucracies that allowed them to use complicated regulatory regimes 
(including assuring tariff free access to intermediate inputs for exporters through effective duty 
drawback mechanisms) that provided exporters with incentives that were no worse than for sales on 
the domestic market. Most developing countries have been unsuccessful implementing the regulatory 
measures employed by South Korea and Taiwan. Consequently, we believe the low uniform-tariff, 
open economy model of Chile is the best policy to avoid penalizing exports and encourage growth and 
poverty reduction through export led growth.  
Upon accession to the WTO, Ukraine committed to maximum average tariffs on industrial goods of 
4.95 percent and 10.66 percent for agricultural products, or an overall average of about 6 percent.
4
 
Ukraine’s average tariff is comparable to other Transition economies that have acceded to the WTO, 
and lower than the average developing country. This indicates that the present tariff policy of Ukraine 
does not present substantial anti-export bias and, except for a few sectors with tariff peaks, the tariff 
regime is not an impediment to Ukrainian development. The main concern regarding tariff policy is to 
guard against internal pressures and regional alignments that would increase the anti-export bias and 
distortions of the tariff regime.  
2. A Supportive Climate for Trade and Business 
In annex tables 2 and 3 we present data on institutions related to international trade and to the business 
climate. It is not coincidental that Singapore and Hong Kong, the two formerly developing countries 
that are now richer than the United States, are ranked numbers one and two in the world in the Doing 
Business rankings for 2012, while South Korea is eighth, Taiwan is 16
th
, Mauritius is 19
th
 and Chile is 
37
th
. On the component of the Doing Business survey for “Trading Across Borders,” Singapore, Hong 
Kong and South Korea are ranked in the top three places in the world.  
Ukraine ranks 137
th
 out of 185 countries in the Doing Business rankings, and is 145
th
 on the 
Trading Across Borders component, a measure of trade facilitation performance. In the global 
competitiveness indicators of the World Economic Forum, Ukraine ranks considerably below the high 
growth countries. Improving institutions and regulations that facilitate investment and trade is very 
challenging and takes considerable political will. But the example of Georgia during the past ten years 
demonstrates that very substantial improvement in the business climate is possible within a decade. 
Georgia moved up from 100 in the world in the 2006 Doing Business rankings to 9
th
 in the world in 
the 2013. 
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2013 measures Ukraine’s participation rate in the global 
value chain at 63%, above Russia but below many of the most successful exporting economies. The 
participation rate indicates the share of Ukraine’s exports that is part of a global value chain.5 The 
report also highlights that growth in a country’s GDP per capita is correlated with growth in its 
participation in the global value chain. Although the reasons for growth in the participation in the 
global value chain differ widely across countries, many countries have seen increased participation in 
the global value chain follow initial increases in foreign (imported) value-added, e.g., via additional 
foreign investment. 
                                                     
4
 See the website of the WTO at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr511_e.htm.  
5
 It adds the foreign value added used in Ukraine’s exports and the value added supplied by Ukraine to other countries’ 
exports, divided by total exports of Ukraine. 
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Ukraine is abundantly endowed with fertile land and natural resources and has a relatively low-cost 
skilled labor force. Educational attainment is high. It is specialized (has a comparative advantage) in 
ferrous metals and cereals, which generate more than 22% and some 10% of total export earnings, 
respectively. Mineral fuels, nuclear reactors and boilers, electrical machinery and rail locomotives, 
each account for another 5% or so of merchandise exports. In the last 15 years it has demonstrated the 
ability to diversify: new products and new markets accounted for over 60% of Ukraine’s trade growth 
between 1994 and 2007 (Cheptea, Fontagné and Zignago, 2010).  
There is great potential to exploit its endowments better, however, not just in food and natural 
resource-based products – where international demand will continue to expand rapidly as the global 
middle class continues to grow – but also in skill-intensive sectors, including services – e.g., 
information technology-related activities. Sectors where Ukraine has particularly strong competitive 
opportunities include grains, dairy, civil aircraft and related engineering and green energy (OECD, 
2011). Our recommends below will help put in place policies and processes, including a trade policy, 
that create a business environment that attracts investment into these and other activities that build on 
Ukraine’s endowments and location. 
III. Expanding Participation in International Production Networks 
While comparative advantage in the past was based on vertically integrated industries, recent 
managerial and technological changes (including the decline in worldwide transport costs) have made 
it much easier for firms in countries to specialize in specific production activities that are part of an 
international production process. These changes have made it possible for firms to sell to the world 
market without having to have access to a variety of efficient domestic input suppliers or needing to 
rely on domestic demand. Competitiveness in today’s global economy requires participation in supply 
chains. 
The ability of firms in a country to participate in – and contribute to – supply chains depends on the 
level of prevailing trade and operating costs. These are determined by many factors including trade 
policies, such as import tariffs, export restrictions and local content requirements, as well as the 
efficiency of border management; the quality of transport and logistics services; product regulation, 
licensing requirements, certification and conformity assessment procedures for standards, and the 
degree of competition that prevails on services markets. Uncertainty regarding the treatment of 
products at borders and along transport routes can have major impacts on supply chain efficiency and 
investment. These regulations are often applied in an inefficient manner that raises costs; but since 
they also have a legitimate regulatory function, they cannot be simply eliminated as a policy decision. 
An effort to consider the impacts of regulation on trade costs more broadly can help Ukraine attain the 
nation’s trade vision while at the same time improving trade outcomes for partner countries, deepening 
integration of neighboring markets and improving competitiveness more generally.  
Although regulatory policies typically raise costs more for foreign firms (due to duplication), they 
raise costs for domestic firms as well – and thus the price of goods and services for buyers, whether 
firms or households. New estimates reveal that a concerted effort to improve trade facilitation 
performance and related transport and communications services to halfway global best practice in 
Ukraine could increase is real incomes by 25% or more and increase exports by more than 50% 
(Ferrantino and Tsigas, 2013). 
The challenge is to identify actions that are needed to achieve such gains and to build momentum 
and support for their implementation. In our view this requires cooperation between the public and 
private sectors. One mechanism that has been suggested by Hoekman (2013) to achieve this are supply 
chain councils. These comprise public-private partnerships that involve the business community and 
economic policy officials and regulators, that focus on the supply chain as a whole in a sector or area 
of trade. Reducing supply chain barriers is not straightforward as there may be several or even many 
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policies that impede the efficient operation of supply chains. If one policy problem is addressed, 
another may take its place by becoming more binding. To be effective in lowering supply chain 
barriers a comprehensive and integrated approach is needed that spans all of the key sectors that 
impact on international supply chains, including product standards and services such as transport, 
communication, banking and distribution that serve as the backbone of a modern economy. Policies to 
ensure that services are more widely available at reasonable cost are important if Ukraine is to better 
utilize the opportunities offered by participation in international supply chains. Close involvement of 
business is needed to ensure that priorities for concerted action to reduce supply chain barriers are 
identified and to generate information to allow monitoring of progress over time. A key feature of all 
the development miracle countries is effective communications with businesses and other 
stakeholders. Creating bodies that include representatives of the public sector (regulatory agencies) 
and industry could help generate information and on-going assessments of regulatory trade barriers 
and costs, and provide concrete proposals for reforms.
6
 
Such supply chain councils should be action oriented and designed so that information on 
performance (outcomes) is compiled and discussed regularly. The key objective of the councils should 
be to make a tangible positive difference on the ground for business and thereby show that 
governments are serious in facilitating trade and enhancing incentives for supply chain participation 
and investment. Identifying how various policy areas jointly affect supply chains would complement 
the sector and policy instrument-specific disciplines of trade agreements by encouraging a focus on all 
policies that together impact on all the links in supply chains.  
A key rationale for the proposed approach is to cut across prevailing regulatory “silos.” Each 
council would establish performance baselines, identify and agree on actions to improve on these and 
put in place effective quantitative monitoring mechanisms to track progress so as to be able to identify 
problems and hold governments accountable for making progress. Monitoring should be based in part 
on operating data that is supplied by business to an independent body that ensures data quality. Supply 
chain councils can be global or regional in their focus, and, if effective, will help improve Ukraine’s 
institutional basis for trade. The choice of specific supply chains councils to be selected is best 
determined in consultation with the business community, but given supply chain barriers prevalent in 
trade with Russia in August 2013, we suggest priority application to trade relations with Russia and 
the ECU.  
IV. Regional Trade Agreements and Ukraine’s Economic Growth 
In 2012, the EU and ECU trading blocs accounted for more than 57% of the value of Ukraine’s 
merchandise exports and 71% of merchandise imports (according to the State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine). The ECU countries account for 32.5% of exports and 40% of imports, while the EU27 
accounts for 25% of exports and 31% of imports. Turkey, China, India, Egypt and United States 
combined account for another 17% of both export and imports. 
The Eurasian Customs Union is an important export market for machinery and transport 
equipment, while the EU is a major market for metals. Fuels, including natural gas, dominate imports 
from ECU members. Trade with the EU is more diverse, including machinery, transport equipment 
and other manufactured products. Ukraine also exports pipeline transit services to Russia, whereas the 
EU is a major supplier of financial, technical and other business services. 
                                                     
6
 Organizations such as the World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the International Trade Centre have endorsed 
similar approaches. See World Economic Forum et al (2013), Hoekman and Mattoo (2013), Inklaar (2009) and Cadot et 
al. (2012).  
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1. The Eurasian Customs Union and Ukraine 
Russia is keen to see Ukraine join the Eurasian Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. 
Ukraine currently has a free trade status with the members of the ECU, which are very important 
markets that Ukraine must endeavor to preserve and expand.
7
 The Institute of Economic Research and 
Policy Consulting (2011) has documented, however, that despite the existence of a free trade 
agreement between Ukraine and Russia, there are significant non-tariff barriers between the two 
countries. The border clearance problems in August 2013 dramatically highlight longstanding trade 
facilitation problems and suggest priority be given to using the Observer status in the ECU to find 
ways to resolve existing problems and to more closely cooperate with the ECU in areas where that 
cooperation supports its development goals, while avoiding the potentially negative aspects of the 
ECU. Such cooperation should entail not just expansion of the “deeper” aspects of trade agreements, 
but a change in the way deeper integration is approached, by building greater political support from 
the business community on both sides of the border through a supply chain centered approach to lower 
trade costs with Russia and the ECU. 
Develop “Deeper” aspects of trade agreements with Russia and the ECU. Research has shown 
that the greatest benefits from preferential trade agreements comes from the deep aspects of the 
agreements, not from the preferential tariff commitments (Schiff and Winters, 2003). Analysis of the 
potential gains for Ukraine from trade reforms suggest that lowering trade costs created by regulatory 
policies will generate much larger gains than changes in import tariffs (Ferrantino and Tsigas, 2013).
8
 
There are many potential areas for closer relations with Russia and the ECU based on 
intergovernmental trade agreements, of which the following are possibilities: better border control 
procedures to facilitate trade; provision of rights for foreign investors in services; a government 
procurement agreement; mutual recognition of standards and technical regulations; agreement to 
accept the certification of conformity assessment authorities in the partner country; mutual recognition 
agreements of the qualifications of professionals such as lawyers, accountants and engineers; 
agreement to avoid antidumping actions against partner country firms, using domestic competition 
policy instead; and bilateral labor agreements. Negotiation of agreements in all of these areas and 
others will mutually benefit Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In some areas this would bring 
trade relations with the ECU closer than with the EU even after ratification of the new DCFTA with 
the EU. The specific choice of what areas should be pursued as a priority in deeper trade cooperation 
is best left for supply chain councils established for trade between Ukraine and Russia and the ECU to 
determine.  
Develop supply chain councils for trade with the ECU and Russia. The traditional approach to 
negotiating trade agreements and dealing with nontariff barriers ignores the new reality of how 
                                                     
7
 The trade agreements between Ukraine and ECU member countries stipulate duty-free trade in all goods while allowing 
for unspecified potential exemptions. The core exemptions, frequently introduced in bilateral protocols, include sugar, 
tobacco and cigarettes, alcohol and sometimes non-alcoholic beverages. In addition, there is a practice of reciprocal 
responses to export duties set by a trading partner. An important source of tension is Russian bans on Ukrainian exports 
for SPS reasons, notably exports of livestock and dairy products; which are perceived as non-tariff barriers by Ukraine – 
see Institute for Economic Research (2011, pp. 16-17). 
8
 Mkrtchyan (2013) undertakes an empirical analysis of the impacts on trade costs within the ECU and concludes that 
implementation of the customs union had a statistically significant impact on lowering intra-ECU trade costs. At the same 
time there is evidence that ECU rules have led to an increase in trade costs with the rest of the world for both Kazakhstan 
and Belarus. The global ranking of Kazakhstan on the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) declined from 62 
in 2010 to 82 in 2012. There are no LPI data for Belarus in 2010, but the ranking of Belarus on the Trading Across 
Borders index (part of the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators) deteriorated from 129 in 2010 to 150 in 2013. 
(Russia’s global ranking on the LPI has remained about the same). A World Bank trade study for Kazakhstan, 
Vashakmadze (2012), indicates that trade costs for Kazakhstan have increased for trade with third countries. Russia is 
concerned about transshipment through Kazakhstan and Belarus. Consequently, ECU rules of origin for Kazakhstan’s 
trade with Central Asian CIS countries are being enforced more strictly. Trade costs for Belarus with the European Union 
have also increased.  
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international production is organized. Trade agreements are not designed with a supply chain 
perspective, and thus may not do enough to address the policies that have the biggest negative effects 
for business. A supply chain council approach is flexible in the sense of not pre-defining what will be 
the focus of cooperation. It instead allows the main constraints at a given point in time to be identified. 
Establishment of a number of supply chain councils organized around the major export sectors for 
both Ukraine and ECU countries with a mandate to identify the most important sources of supply 
chain inefficiencies as well as actions to resolve them is an alternative to seeking to address trade 
problems through traditional trade agreements, whether free trade agreement or customs unions. They 
are likely to be more effective than purely inter-governmental mechanisms by mobilizing the 
engagement and support of business on both sides. Business representatives and industry organizations 
have hands-on knowledge of the impacts of regulatory policies and enforcement and of how costly 
they are. And businessmen on both sides of the negotiations are likely to have many common interests 
in lowering trade costs. Recommendations for regulatory reform of these councils can be implemented 
by governments with the knowledge that they have support from business on all sides.  
Implementation of the Common External Tariff. As is common in customs unions worldwide, a 
fundamental feature of the ECU is that all the members implement the common external tariff of the 
customs union. This extends to exceptions from the most favored nation tariff, such as for free trade 
agreements. These are agreed at the level of the customs union with all members offering the same 
concessions to partner countries. This has both legal and economic implications.  
Incompatibility of the Eurasian Customs Union and the DCFTA with the EU. Since the ECU 
does not offer tariff free access to imports from the EU, this means that if Ukraine were to join the 
ECU, it would not be able to offer tariff free access to imports from the EU. That is, since the Eurasian 
Customs Union does not have a free trade agreement with the European Union, this means that 
Ukrainian participation in the ECU is incompatible with the DCFTA with the EU. 
Violation of WTO Commitments. In its accession to the WTO, Ukraine committed to an average 
maximum tariff of about six percent. In 2013, the average unweighted applied tariff of the ECU is 10 
percent (Shepotylo and Tarr, 2012). This means that if Ukraine joins the ECU it would have to 
increase its tariffs to implement the ECU common external tariff, and in so doing, violate its WTO 
tariff commitments. WTO members would have the right to impose compensatory tariff increases 
specifically against Ukrainian exports, such as steel and agricultural exports. For Ukraine to avoid 
these tariff increases, the ECU would have to lower its bound tariffs at the WTO to “pay 
compensation.” It is not clear ECU members would be willing to do so; if they do not it would put 
Ukrainian exports at risk.  
Economic Losses to Ukraine from Applying the Common External Tariff. Movchan and Giucci 
(2011) have estimated economic losses to Ukraine from joining the ECU due to the fact that Ukraine 
would have to increase its tariffs outside of the CIS, so the costs of imports and the anti-export bias 
would increase from the tariff increase. These estimates of losses are consistent with research that 
finds a similar result for Kazakhstan as a result of its increase in tariffs when it joined the ECU in 2010 
(World Bank, 2012).  
2. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU 
Since the DCFTA is a free trade agreement and not a customs union, Ukraine would retain its full 
independence or sovereignty regarding it external tariffs with third countries, while both parties would 
provide tariff free access to imports originating in the partner region, with some exceptions. The 
DCFTA, as a “deep” agreement, covers many areas where Ukraine will be expected to approximate its 
legislation with that prevailing in the European Union. A very brief summary of the 15 chapters of the 
DCFTA is provided in Annex 2.  
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Movchan and Giucci (2011) estimate substantial welfare gains from a DCFTA, due mainly to 
better market access on EU markets for exports, and productivity gains from the deep aspects of the 
agreement. Shepotylo (2013) estimates a very substantial increase in exports to all countries following 
the DCFTA, due significantly to the elimination of uncertainty facing investors once a decision to 
proceed with the DCFTA is taken. 
Adoption of the EU Acquis. The DCFTA requires substantial changes in Ukrainian regulation to 
be in line with current EU regulation. It may thus be seen as a large step along the path to eventual 
membership in the EU. Implementation of the DCFTA would likely lead to economic gains from 
improved Ukrainian institutions in several areas. For example, it is likely that the EU would assist with 
trade facilitation and the DCFTA would likely speed the progress regarding adoption of international 
standards.  
The EU-Russia “Partnership for Modernization” has listed harmonization of Russia’s technical 
regulations and standards with the EU as a priority for cooperation
9
 and the associated program of 
assistance is aimed at aligning Russian standards with EU norms and regulations.
10
 As a result, the 
ECU (which has responsibility for technical regulations on industrial goods and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures throughout the Customs Union) may harmonize technical product 
regulations with those applied by the EU. Although this process will take considerable time 
(reportedly SPS approximation is not going well—see European Commission (2013b)),11 an 
implication is that as Ukraine moves toward alignment of standards with the EU, it will also be 
converging toward a common target with the members of the ECU. 
In some cases, however, approximation to the EU acquis may impose more costs than benefits and 
indeed might cause very substantial costs. A specific example concerns sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. A necessary element in converging towards international standards and thus facilitating 
exports is to move away from production and import controls based on GOST standards inherited 
from the former Soviet Union. SPS norms based on GOST standards are non-tariff barriers since they 
regulate aspects of products unrelated to safety, are outdated and often are not science based (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013). As part of their WTO accession agreements, both Ukraine and Russia have 
agreed to move toward international SPS standards. 
Nonetheless, experience has shown the full and immediate application of EU SPS requirements for 
sales on the Ukrainian market (as opposed to exports) is likely to force large parts of the Ukrainian 
food sector out of business and would raise food costs in Ukraine. Messerlin et al. (2011) estimate that 
similar SPS harmonization with the EU for Georgia could increase food costs in Georgia by 90 
percent. Reporting on the experience of the Eastern European countries that acceded to the EU, the 
World Bank (2007, p.65) notes that despite very significant support from the EU, large parts of the 
food industry was forced out of business because of the costs of the upgrades needed to meet EU 
requirements. The report concludes that harmonization with EU food safety and agricultural health 
legislation is neither necessary nor realistic for CIS countries and that they are best served by carefully 
prioritizing actions in this area based on assessments of costs, benefits, and trade opportunities. This 
recommendation is bolstered given that the scale of financial and technical support provided to 
accession countries is not available for CIS countries. 
                                                     
9
 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf. 
10
 The European Commission (2013b) notes that under the Partnership for Modernization program there are projects to 
align 19 technical product and horizontal standards by the end of 2013. A draft agreement between Rosstandart and 
European standards bodies CEN and CENELEC was to be signed in 2013 and an EU-Russian industry task force was 
formed to pursue approximation of technical regulations and use of international standards. 
11
 At the WTO SPS Committee in October 2012, Russia disputed EU allegations that Russia’s restrictions on imports of live 
animals were not supported by evidence or risk analysis. 
 See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/sps_18oct12_e.htm. 
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This suggests a case by case approach to adoption of SPS norms. A differentiated approach is 
needed based on assessments of health risks, costs, benefits and trade opportunities. Presumably 
recognizing the high costs of adjustment, the SPS chapter in the DCFTA refers to adoption of SPS 
conditions as a process. Adopting some EU standards and regulations immediately may be important 
from a market access (export) perspective; for others, it may be better to defer until Ukrainian incomes 
are higher, thereby providing a domestic market for more expensive products. A “differentiated 
approach” has been adopted by some Latin American countries in free trade agreements with the U.S. 
These involve a dual production structure for some products where companies that export to the U.S. 
must meet the higher U.S. standards and products that meet these standards are admitted; but, 
crucially, for products where adaption to U.S. standards would be excessively costly, companies that 
produce according to less costly standards are permitted to sell domestically. 
The general point that is illustrated by the example of SPS standards is the importance of adopting 
a case-by-case approach to issues that involve regulatory reform and convergence. An area of 
particular importance from a growth perspective that is covered by the DCFTA is trade and investment 
in services. For Ukraine to be competitive on global markets and to be able to participate effectively in 
international supply chains and attract investment that relies on international production networks, 
Ukraine must offer efficient transport, financial, logistics and communications services.
12
 A benefit of 
the DCFTA is that it will require concerted attention on services policies. However, a focus on the EU 
acquis in services will by itself not be sufficient to ensure Ukraine will have policies that are most 
conducive to substantial improvements in the productivity of services firms. Much will continue to 
depend on the national policy choices on a sector-by-sector basis. This also is true for Ukraine’s 
external trade and investment policies for services as it will retain substantial discretion in how to treat 
foreign (non-EU) investors. 
3. EU Membership or a Customs Union with the EU: the Cases of Poland and Turkey 
Membership in the EU would be a positive step for Ukraine. Outside of agriculture, the EU trade 
regime is generally rather open, and preferential market access to agricultural markets in the EU would 
benefit Ukraine; aid would likely be available for regulatory reforms; and membership would imply 
full participation in EU decision making. However, aligning external tariffs with those of the EU (that 
is, effectively creating a customs union with the EU) would be a mistake. The contrasting cases of 
Poland and Turkey, also large agricultural producers, are instructive. 
Poland acceded to the EU as a member on May 1, 2004. As an EU member, Poland enjoys full 
market access to the EU markets, including in agriculture, coal and steel; its farmers receive subsidies 
under the Common Agricultural Policy and Poland received substantial support for harmonization of 
SPS measures and technical regulations. Regarding all countries with which the EU negotiates free 
trade agreements, Polish exporters receive preferential market access to the markets of those countries. 
These are major benefits to Poland of EU membership in addition to full participation in EU decision 
making. 
Turkey is not an EU member, but signed a customs union agreement with the EU in 1995. 
Agriculture, coal and steel were predominantly excluded from its customs union agreement, it receives 
no support from the Common Agricultural Policy and it has received much more limited support for 
harmonization of standards (Ozturk, 2013). Regarding all countries with which the EU negotiates free 
trade agreements, Turkey is obligated to provide preferential tariff access to imports, but these free 
trade agreements do not provide for preferential market access for Turkish exports to those markets. 
The requirement to provide unilateral preferential market access to all these countries has led to 
considerable Turkish dissatisfaction with its Customs Union with the EU. In particular, Turkish 
                                                     
12
 Using a large firm level dataset over the period 2001 to 2007, Shepotylo and Vakhitov (2012) show the strong impact on 
the productivity of Ukrainian firms from better access to services and from services liberalization. 
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Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan said on March 2013 that Turkey should review the membership 
now that it “creates unfair treatment in trade with the union.”13 
V. Conclusions: Possible Elements of a Trade Strategy Looking Forward 
The foregoing considerations and international experience more generally suggest a number of 
principles and approaches that can inform Ukraine’s trade strategy: 
1. Use supply chain councils as a focal point for international cooperation to integrate 
markets and lower trade costs. Pursuit of specific public-private partnerships involving 
cooperation between business and regulatory authorities from both sides to reduce trade costs 
can do much to improve economic growth prospects and realize the objective of integrating 
markets with both the EU and the ECU. Given border control issues with the ECU, this is a 
priority in the near term. The proposal by the Government of Ukraine to establish a joint 
commission to promote trade ties between Ukraine, Russia and the EU is a positive step that 
could evolve into the supply chain councils we recommend.  
2. Safeguard current trade privileges, encourage foreign direct investment and think 
globally, including expanding the number of free trade agreements. Ukraine enjoys tariff-
free access to CIS countries and preferential tariffs for exports to the EU. Active pursuit of 
additional free trade agreements and encouragement on foreign direct investment will generate 
new job opportunities for Ukrainian workers. Ukraine has already started down this path, 
launching talks with Canada and Singapore, and having already concluded a free trade 
agreement with the EFTA countries. 
3. A strong national focus on reducing trade costs. Import tariffs and other policies that 
increase the costs of products reduce the ability of Ukrainian firms to participate in 
international production networks. Holding tariffs low, pursuing trade facilitation initiatives 
and improving the quality of backbone services such as telecommunications and logistics are 
critical for Ukrainian competitiveness by ensuring firms benefit from low trade costs. 
 
  
                                                     
13
 Quoted in Today’s Zaman. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-310708-minister-says-turkey-to-reconsider-
eu-customs-union.html  
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Annex 1: Statistical Tables  
Table 1: Gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) (Current 
US dollars) 
Country 1982 1992 2002 2012* 2012/1982 2012/1992
Chile 3,012 6,185 10,440 18,419 6.1 3.0
Hong Kong 8,540 20,093 28,342 51,494 6.0 2.6
Korea 3,012 9,436 18,859 32,272 10.7 3.4
Mauritius 2,107 5,116 8,858 15,592 7.4 3.0
Singapore 8,792 19,882 34,726 60,410 6.9 3.0
Taiwan 4,425 11,892 21,591 38,749 8.8 3.3
Ukraine n/a 5,164 4,007 7,374 n/a 1.4
United States 14,015 24,700 36,950 49,922 3.6 2.0
Notes: (*) IMF estimate.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx
Year Ratios
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Table 2: Ranking on the Global Competitiveness Index and Several of its Components, rank out of 144 Countries in 2012-2013 
Overall 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index
Institutions Infrastructure
Goods market 
efficiency
Labor market 
efficiency
Financial 
market 
development
Chile 33 28 45 30 34 28
Hong Kong 9 10 1 2 3 1
Korea 19 62 9 29 73 71
Mauritius 54 39 54 27 70 35
Singapore 2 1 2 1 2 2
Taiwan 13 26 17 8 22 19
Ukraine 73 132 65 117 62 114
United States 7 41 14 23 6 16
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013
http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/
Detailed components
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Table 3: Rankings of Selected Countries from the Doing Business Database for 2013: Overall Ease of Doing Business, Trading Across Borders and 
its Components 
Ease of 
Doing 
Business
Rank
Overall Rank 
on Trading 
Across 
Borders
Documents 
to export 
(number)
Time to 
export (days)
Cost to 
export  per 
container 
(US$)
Documents 
to import 
(number)
Time to 
import (days)
Cost to 
import per 
container 
(US$)
Chile 37 48 6 15 980 6 12 965
Hong Kong 2 2 4 5 575 4 5 565
Korea 8 3 3 7 665 3 7 695
Mauritius 19 15 5 10 660 6 10 695
Singapore 1 1 4 5 456 4 4 439
Taiwan 16 23 6 10 655 6 10 720
Ukraine 137 145 6 30 1,865 8 33 2,155
United States 4 22 4 6 1,090 5 5 1,315
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2013 database.
http://www.doingbusiness.org/
Trading Across Borders
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Annex 2: Main Elements of the DCFTA 
 
1. Market Access for Goods: Removal of most import and export duties (more than 98 percent in 
value), with exceptions (claimed to be temporary) for some products, mainly in the agricultural, 
chemical, clothing, metals and automobile sectors. 
2. Trade Remedies: Anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and global safeguard instruments will be WTO 
consistent. Ukraine may apply a specific safeguard measure for car imports from the EU for a 
period of 15 years. 
3. Technical barriers to trade: The parties reiterate their commitment to the WTO TBT agreement. 
The parties will harmonize or mutually recognize technical standards. Ukraine will 
progressively adapt its technical regulations and standards to those of the EU. Trade in industrial 
products will eventually be conducted as between Member States of the EU. 
4. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures: Ukraine commits to a process in which it will align 
its SPS legislation to the EU's. The chapter addresses verification procedures and settlement of 
trade problems. 
5. Customs and trade facilitation: Simplify customs requirements and formalities. 
6. Establishment, trade in services and electronic commerce: The agreement provides for the right 
of establishment in services and non-services subject to a limited set of excluded sectors 
identified in a negative list, and the expansion and integration of Ukraine into the internal 
market of the EU in telecommunications, financial services, maritime services and postal and 
courier services once Ukraine effectively implements the EU acquis in these sectors.  
7. Capital Movements: Provisions for the free movement of capital with safeguards. 
8. Public procurement: With the exception of defense procurement, EU and Ukrainian suppliers 
will have integrated access to public procurement once Ukraine adopts EU legislation on public 
procurement.  
9. Intellectual property: Enforcement based on the EU's internal rules. 
10. Competition: Ukraine commits to state aids control, competition law and enforcement along the 
lines of the EU acquis. 
11. Trade-related energy: Prohibition of dual pricing and commitment to ensure competition and 
market prices for gas and electricity. Interrupting transit of energy goods destined for another 
party is prohibited, e.g., blocking shipments of Russian gas to the EU is prohibited.  
12. Transparency: Process for comments, review and appeal of proposed regulation by interested 
parties. 
13. Trade and sustainable development: Commitment to environmental protection and to the core 
labor standards of the International Labor Organization. 
14. Dispute Settlement: The WTO Dispute Settlement procedures will be followed with faster 
procedures.  
15. Mediation mechanism: A mutually appointed mediator will mediate trade disputes and 
recommend solutions within 60 days. The parties can still access dispute settlement if they 
choose.  
Source: European Commission (2013a). 
 
 
